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The current debate on financial contagion is by and large motivated by policy
questions. What can we do to prevent contagion? Should we do anything about it? In this
paper we attempt to identify and evaluate the public policy implications of recent research
on financial contagion.
It may be useful to state, at the outset, the scope and conceptual approach of our
inquiry. With respect to its scope, we intend to limit our discussion to policies that deal
with financial contagion across countries. The focus is related to but is narrower than
asking what can be done in general to deal with financial and currency crises. In
particular, it emriphasizes  policies designed to deal with external forces.
Conceptually, our approach will be to evaluate policy in the context of an existing
theoretical explanation of contagion. Reference to some theory of contagion is needed in
order to evaluate the desirability and predict the implications of policy responses.
Unfortunately fbr our purposes, there is no current agreement on what is the "best"
explanation for contagion, and different explanations have rather different iimplications
for policy. Hence we need to take a stand on what we believe to be the most adequate
explanation of financial contagion, from which we can expand on its implications for
policy.
Accordingly, our discussion begins with the statement of a simple theoretical
framework that can explain contagion. We describe a very simple model oi financial
crises that can be driven by a combination of fundamentals and by self fulfilling market
expectations. 3 The possibility of crises turns out to depend on external factors such as
foreign interest rates and the confidence or pessimism of international investors. It is in
such a sense that "contagion" may occur. But the model allows us to be more precise and
identify different notions of contagion, in particular the distinction between "monsoonal
effects," "spillovers," and "switches between equilibria" emphasized by Masson (1998).
We then proceed to a discussion of policy alternatives, both at the domestic and the
Our premnise  is that, although recent crises wvere  by and large caused by financial  panics,  bad policy may
have played a role in making financial panics possible. For a discussion of the distinction between financial
panics and bad policy, see Chang (1999).
2international level, inspired by our analytical approach. At the domestic level, we
emphasize the need for policies aimed at reducing financial fragility; in the context of the
model below, this means reducing unnecessary short debt commitments. These
commitments can be explicit, in which case the focus can be in lengthening the maturity
of external debt. But they can also be implicit, as in the presence of private liability
guarantees. We emphasize that limiting or eliminating such guarantees can be seen as a
way to improve an economy's international liquidity situation and reduce its exposure to
contagion.
At the international level, we stress the need for improving financial standards. In the
context of our theoretical discussion, such improvements help assess when a given
country may be subject to the different kinds of contagion. Hence they are crucial to
identify when policy reforms or international assistance packages are warranted. We also
discuss international liquidity assistance and the question of an international lender of last
resort. We show that international rescue packages may be effective or not, depending on
the kind of contagion that a country may be experiencing. Henlce  our analysis illustrates
the principle that the international community should help those and only those countries
that are already helping themselves.
2.  A Theoretical Framework
Any discussion of the appropriate policy response to international contagion must be
based on an analytical understanding of contagion, as given by a model of that
phenomenon. In this section we advance a simple framework to illustrate some important
aspects and difficulties associated with policy evaluation.
The model is very simple and focuses on a country that needs to roll over some
foreign debt. It is similar, in several respects, to the models of Calvo (1988), Obstfeld
(1994), and, most closely, Cole and Kehoe (1996).4  It delivers a sharp characterization of
the different ways in which foreign events may affect the possibility of a crisis, that is, of
4Lambertini  (1999) extends  Cole  and Kehoe  (1996)  to include  capital  accumulation  and uncertainty.
3Masson's (1  998) distinction between "spillovers," "monsoonal effects," and "pure
contagion."
2.1.  A Small Open Economy
Consider a small open economy populated by a representative agent and lasting only
one period. The government of this economy inherits some foreign debt that matures at
the end of the period. At that point, the amount due for repayment is given by B > 0 units
of an international currency, say dollars.
At the beginning of the period, the government may attempt to roll over its debt. If so,
it sells claims to B'= B dollars, payable at the end of the period, in a competitive auction.
The bidders in the auction are a large number of atomistic foreign investors. We assume
that foreign investors have access to alternative investments that return (l+r) dollars at
the end of the period per dollar invested at the beginning. In other words, the foreign
opportunity cost of funds is denoted by r Ž 0. All agents are rational and risk neutral.
Hence foreign investors will buy the new government debt if and only if its price, denoted
by q, is equal to 1/(I +r) times their subjective probability that the debt will be in fact
honored. We assume that the proceeds from the auction, qB', are transferred immediately
from foreign investors to the government.
It will help to use the notation B' = 0 for the case in which the government does not
try to roll over the debt. After the auction takes place, the government may decide to
default on its obligations (z = 0) or not (z = 1). The relative cost of default depends on
some additional aspects of the economy. The service of the old debt that is not rolled over
must be financed with the proceeds of some tax, which is assumed to be distortionary.
Hence, under our assumptions, the revenue from that tax is
(1)  T=zB-qB'.
Equation 1 implies that, if the govermment  does not default, distortionary taxes can be
reduced by a successful rollover of the debt; this is why debt rollover may be desirable.
Alternatively, distortionary taxes decrease if there is default on the old debt.
4We assume that the service of the new debt B' can be financed with a lump sum tax,5
and that defaulting on any portion of the debt is assumed to be costly. As a consequence,
the amount available for consumption in this economy at the end of the period is given by
(2)  c = y - T - F(T) - zB' -l z-l  I  D,
where y is the economy's income (assumed, for simplicity, to be exogenously given), D is
the cost of default, Ixj  is the absolute value of x, and F(T) is the excess burden of the tax
T. For simplicity, we shall assume that F(T) = T2 .6
Finally, it is assumed that the government's objective is to maximize the expected
value of the country's end of period consumption. Equilibrium in this model is defined in
the obvious way. We can clearly say that there is a crisis  if, in equilibrium, default occurs.
In this model, if the governnent  can roll over its old debt it will be able to replace
distortionary taxes by a lump sum one. However, such a benefit may be reaped only if
foreign investors are willing to buy the new debt, which depends on their opportunity cost
of funds and their expectations of default. It has already been noted that, in equilibrium,
the price of new debt, q, must be equal to the expected value of zI( I+r). There is potential
for international spillovers and "contagion," therefore, to the extent that the value of r or
the expectations of default depend on events and crises in other countries. We shall come
back to such international transmission questions after characterizing the possible
outcomes of this model.
2.2.  Equilibria
Consider what happens if the government does not try to roll over the debt. Then B'  =
0, and the final outcome depends on whether the government defaults on the old debt B.
' The asymmetry  between old and new debt is intended to capture more fundamental costs associated with
the failure of rolling over extant debt. It is not hard to find assumptions on the timing of payments,
technology, and available taxes that deliver the same result. For example, suppose that the old debt is due
while production is still taking place, and that the only available tax at that point distorts production
decisions. In contrast, the new debt may be due after the production process is finished, at which point the
government can just expropriate some of the output. For a much richer setup, see Cole and Kehoe (1996).
6 The analysis can be extended easily to a convex function F such that F(O) = 0, F'(0) = 0, and F">  0.
5If it does, z = 0 and, by (1), T = 0 as well; that is, all taxes are avoided. However,
defaulting costs D, and hence final consumption is c = y - D. If the gover-nent  does not
default,  T = B, and  final consumption  is c = y - B - B2. It follows  that default  occurs if
and only if the direct cost of default is less than the total cost of taxation:
(3)  B+B 2 >D.
The resulting  level of consumption  is c = y - min{B  + B2 , D}.
If the government attempts to roll over the debt, things are a little more complicated.
The final outcomes are affected by the success of that attempt, as reflected in the price of
the new debt, which in turn depends on expectations of default. But whether default is
optimal for the government depends, in part, on the cost of debt service. Therefore, there
may be multiple equilibrium outcomes.
If r is not too large, which will be assumed hereon, there are essentially two possible
outcomes given an attempted rollover. First, the attempt may be successful, in the sense
that foreign investors expect the new debt to be fully honored, the price of debt is high,
and default does not occur. In that case, z  1, and q = 1/(l+r). From (1), T = B - qB =
rB/(l+r), where the first equality uses B'  B. Using all these facts and (2), it follows that
consumption must be
(4)  c=  y - B(1+2r)/(l+r)  - (rB/1+r)) 2.
For this to be an equilibrium outcome, it must not be profitable for the government to
surprise investors with a default. If the government defaults, z = 0 and, from (1), T = -
B/(l +r) (notice that defaulting implies that the proceeds from the sale of new debt will be
transferred to the representative agent as a subsidy). Inserting these facts in (2), it follows
that consumption would be y + B/(l+r) - (B/(l+r)) 2 - D. In equilibrium, this amount
cannot exceed that in (4), which is the case if and only if
(5)  D > 2B - (l-r)B  /(l+r).
6Hence, if the government attempts to roll over its old debt, it may be successful
provided (5) holds. Note that (5) says that the cost of default D must be large relative to
the original debt, which is intuitive. Also, (5) becomes more stringent with larger r: if
foreign investors need a higher return to purchase new debt, default becomes a more
attractive option for the government. The second possibility is that the government
attempts a debt rollover but it is not successful, in the sense that q is low and default
occurs. In this case, z = 0 and, consequently, q = 0 also. Default implies that all taxes are
zero and that consumption is equal to y - D. For this to be an equilibrium, it must be the
case that default must in fact be optimal after the auction of new debt. Now, if the price of
the new debt falls to zero but there is no default, (1) implies that T = B which, together
with B' = B 7 and (2), means that consumption must be y - 2B - B2. In equilibrium, this
cannot exceed y - D, which requires:
(6)  D '  2B + B2.
In short, what happens if the government tries to roll over its initial debt depends
on the relative values of D and B, as given by (5) and (6). The rollover attempt may be
successful and a crisis maybe avoided when (5) holds; this must be the case, in particular,
if B is sufficiently small. If (6) holds, the attempt will fail and a crisis will ensue. This is
necessarily the case if B is "large." Importantly, both (5) and (6) may hold. In that case,
whether a crisis occurs depends on the (self fulfilling) expectations of foreign investors.
Figure 1 illustrates the case of attempted rollover. The initial amount of debt, B, is
measured along the horizontal axis. The curve OG is the graph of 2B + B2, and OH the
graph of 2B - B2, which is the right hand side of (S) for r = 0. Given the cost of default
D, two values for the initial debt, B, and B2, are determined as in the graph. If B is in the
interval OBI, (5) holds but (6) does not; hence, an attempted rollover must be successful.
'Note that  this  assumes  that, in the auction,  foreign  investors  acquired  a claim  to B' = B at a zero price.
This  seems  extreme,  but the analysis  can easily  be amended  to correct  for  this detail. In addition,  q = 0 is







0  B1  B: 
Maturingforeign  debt
In contrast, (6) holds but (5) does not when B is greater than or equal to B 2; the
implication is that an attempted rollover will fail and default will occur. If B is in the
interval BIB 2, both (5) and (6) hold; there are then two equilibrium outcomes, one with
default and one without it, following an attempted rollover.
Which outcome occurs when two of them are consistent with equilibrium is a difficult
issue. Here, we shall just assume that, when B is in B1B2, the default outcome occurs with
probability p, where p is a number between zero and one. This assumption can be
justified formally. One can assume, for instance, that whether foreign investors welcome
the issue of new debt depends on the realization of some publicly observable random
variable. The important consequence, however, is the same: the good outcome will occur
with probability (l-p)  and the bad one with probability p. It must be noted that p is
arbitrary, as long as it is between zero and one. Hence, p may be a function of any
8observable event. When it happens, a crisis is unnecessary, in the sense that there is
another possible and better equilibrium outcome.
It is important, at this point, to note that Figure 1 depends on several aspects of the
environment. In particular, an increase in r, the opportunity cost of funds demanded by
foreign investors, shifts the OH curve up and to the left, but leaves OG undisturbed. The
implication is that the point B 2 moves to the left, reducing the region of multiple
outcomes and increasing the region in which default must occur.
Now we are ready to go back to the initial decision of the government: will the
government attempt a debt rollover or not? The answer depends on the initial amount of
debt and on the other variables of the model. It is easy to prove that the government will
successfully roll over the debt if B is small enough, that is, if B is in the interval OBI.
Intuitively, rolling over the debt helps avoiding distortionary taxation; the new debt is
well received since its size is small relative to the cost of default. The policy implication
is that there are countries whose fundamentals are so strong that a crisis cannot occur.
If B is outside OBI, the analysis depends on the value of B at which the government,
when rollover is not attempted, is indifferent between defaulting or not. That value is
denoted by B3 in Figure 2; it is given by the intersection of the curve B+B2, given by 01,
and the horizontal line of height D (recall equation 3). Figure 2 is drawn under the
assumption that B3 belongs to B1B2; our analysis can be easily amended if that
assumption fails.
In the case of Figure 2, it is clear what happens if B is greater than B2: if a rollover is
attempted, it will fail for sure, and default will occur with certainty. The government is
indifferent between trying to roll over the debt or not, and final consurnption will be y - D
regardless. Hence, a crisis must occur in a country whose fundamentals are very weak.
If B is in B3B2, the analysis is almost as easy. If a rollover is not attempted, the
government will default on the old debt and final consumption will be y-D. An attempted
rollover will fail with probability p, but with probability (1-p) it will succeed and result in
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Finally, if B is in the interval B1B3, the outcome depends on the value of p. By not
attempting  a rollover,  the government  secures a consumption  level  of y -- B - B2. If it
attempts a rollover, with probability (l-p) there is no crisis and consumption is given by
(4), which is better than y - B - B2. However, with probability p there is a crisis and
consumption falls to y - D, which is worse. It follows that attempting a rollover is the
optimal decision if p is sufficiently small. For simplicity, we shall assurne that to be the
case.
Summarizing, under the assumptions underlying Figure 2 and assuming that p is
small enough, the government will attempt a debt rollover. The rollover will succeed if B
is less than B 1. If B is between B 1 and  B 2, there is a crisis with probability p. A crisis must
occur if the initial debt B is larger than B 2.
102.3.  Contagion
Foreign shocks may affect the probability of crisis in the country under analysis
through two channels. The first is an increase in r, the opportunity cost of foreign funds.
This can be caused by a shift in the monetary policy of industrialized economies, a case
that Masson (1998) tenns "monsoonal effects." Alternatively, it may be that a crisis in a
different country makes foreign investors demand a higher expected return on their
exposure to the country under analysis. This is essentially the case discussed by Valdes
(1996) and Kodres and Pristker (1998) and corresponds to what Masson (1998) called
"spillovers."
Regardless of its cause, an increase in r shifts the curve OH up and to the left. A first
implication is that, when B was originally close but less than B2, the probability of crisis
goes up, from p to one. The intuition is that the cost of debt service goes up relative to the
cost of default, to the point that promising to honor the new debt is no longer credible. 8 A
second implication is that expected consumption goes down because of the increased cost
of servicing the debt.
When multiple outcomes are possible, foreign shocks may also affect the probability
of a crisis directly. This is the case that Masson (1998) calls "pure contagion": foreigners
may become more pessimistic about country A after observing a crisis in country B, even
if there is no fundamental reason for such a shift.  In this model, this would happen if B
belongs to BIB 2 and p goes up following, say, a crisis abroad. Expected consumption
would fall, reflecting the increased probability of default.
The distinction between pure contagion, on the one hand, and monsoonal effects and
spillovers, on the other, is crucial to assess the policy implications of the model. Under
the conditions make pure contagion possible, for example, international assistance in the
event of a crisis is Pareto improving. The promise of the international community to help
a country in distress may be sufficient to eliminate bad equilibria. It has to be noted that
such a promise, as well as other policies that help coordinate expectations on the good
outcome, is desirable whether or not there is contagion.
8 Even  if the auction  of the new debt is successful.
11If observed contagion is due to monsoonal effects or spillovers, policy evaluation
becomes more involved. Distributional considerations are likely to matter. For instance,
an increase in the Federal Funds rate may cause r to increase, and the probability of a
crisis to go up in the country under analysis. On the other hand, it may be beneficial for
the United States for the Federal Reserve to pursue a more restrictive monetary policy.
Likewise, if an r increase is the foreign investors' response to a crisis in a,  different
country, as in Valdes (1996) and Kodres and Pritsker (1998), it is hard to see how the
associated costs can be avoided. At the least, analysis of this case requires a more detailed
description of the constraints of foreign investors.
Finally, susceptibility to contagion depends on initial conditions. It has been seen that
a country is less vulnerable to foreign events the smaller the value of B. In this sense, it
may seem desirable for the country to restrict its foreign debt. However, this cannot be
ascertained unless the determination of B is brought into the discussion. One possibility
may be that B was already "excessive" due to erroneous government poli.cies, in
particular those providing inefficiently large incentives to foreign borrowing. In such a
case, the elimination of such policies would be unambiguously good, reducing distortions
and lowering at the same time the likelihood of crises and contagion. In contrast, one may
argue instead that a large B may have been consistent with the social good. Then lowering
B may lower the probability of a crisis and limit contagion at the cost of introducing other
distortions. The rest of the paper elaborates on these observations and relates them to the
design of practical policy alternatives.
3.  Implications for National Policies
In this section we elaborate on the implications of our discussion on contagion for
domestic policy actions. The presence of "crisis zones," where multiple equilibria obtain,
clearly indicates that there are situations in which it may not be possible to attach a
uniquely defined expected outcome to any measure of economic policy. But this does not
exonerate national governments from enacting appropriate policies: policy actions are not
irrelevant to the extent that they can move the economy out of troubled waters toward
safer harbors. While the occurrence of good equilibria in the "crisis zone" rests to a large
12extent on actions at the international level, we suggest that it is a national responsibility to
select economic policies and structural reforms which may bring the economy out of the
area of instability.
The model of the previous section has schematically addressed some variables that
affect the position of the economy: its liquid liabilities, the cost of default, its exposure to
foreign interest rate shocks. In this section we shall add some flesh to the bone and
discuss three specific areas where actions can be taken to move the economy toward the
stability zone:
*  Debt management, or more generally  management of public sector liabilities,
which may help bringing short term exposures toward levels compatible with a
unique equilibrium.
*  Exchange rate management, which is also a potential device to reduce the
impact of foreign interest rate shocks.
•  Finally, structural reforms directed to improve the resiliency of the financial
system in the aftermath of occasion of financial distress.
These three areas are not exhaustive, but have been prominent in the analysis of the
different episodes of contagion. Debt management has been pointed out as the triggering
factor of the "Tequila crisis;" in that episode, fixed exchange rates also contributed to
spreading the crisis. The supply of implicit guarantees has been prominently indicated as
the cause of the South East Asian crisis. Finally, the role of exchange rate regimes and of
highly leveraged institutions have been selected as causes of contagion spreading from
Russia to Latin America.
Policy actions in any of the three areas are probably not sufficient by themselves to
take the economy away from crisis zone. We shall try to stress the need for coordination
among the three sets of policies in insuring a reduction of the economy exposure to the
risk of contagion.
From an intuitive viewpoint we can characterize contagion as the spread of virus to a
weakened organism. In our approach, the viruses are foreign interest rate shocks and
destabilizing expectations, and the weakened organism is an economy located in the crisis
zone. We focus on how to strengthen a weakened economy and make it less vulnerable;
13hence the discussion of policies to address contagion,  will share common elements with
policies devised to prevent financial crisis in general. In both cases sound policy actions
are those that shift the economy leftward toward the stability area in Chapter 1.
3.1.  Liability Management
As already noted, our theoretical framework implies that the possibility of crises and
contagion is exacerbated with the need to roll over existing debt. This implies that prime
attention should be devoted to the management of foreign liabilities.
While the model took inherited short-term debt as given, for policy purposes we need
to discuss in detail how an economy "inherits" its debts. To a large extent, inherited debt
can be seen as the legacy of previous policy choices, which implicitly or explicitly
selected a specific maturity composition, a currency composition and also a determined
level of "off-balance" liabilities. In addition, we may gain further policy insights by
looking at overall public sector liabilities, as they result from the consolidation of central
bank's and government's balance sheets. This is because relevant choices of economic
policy, such as the selection of public debt financing programs or exchange rate regimes,
are not taken independently by the government or by the central bank.
Liability management may affect the amount of debt, which is due at the end of the
"current" period and is held by foreign investors, by changing its maturity and currency
composition. A longer maturity of the outstanding debt reduces the fraction of the total
debt that needs to be refinanced each year and, with reference to Figure 1, will shift
leftward the position of the economy along the horizontal axis. For instance, if we
consider a one-year funding period and the average maturity is increased from two to four
years, the yearly rollover shrinks from one half to one fourth of the total outstanding
debt. 9
The average maturity is often a consequence of the past inflation history but need not
be. Countries that have experienced high inflation have hardly long termn  fixed rate
instruments, but demand for those assets could be increased by providing medium/long
9 So, if TB denotes the total outstanding bonds in the hands of foreign investors and m their average
maturity, B =TB/m.
14term instruments with suitable forms of financial indexation. Although indexation may
negatively affect the debt burden by rapidly spreading to longer maturities the effects of
temporary increases of short-term interest rates, it has a highly beneficial liquidity effect.
The currency composition of the debt is also relevant to determine the initial need for
international liquidity. Our theoretical discussion has been mainly concerned with the
spread of contagion in a fully "dollarized" economy. But the existence of domestic
currency implies that there is some room for choice in the currency denomination of
debts. If at least part of the debt can be denominated in domestic currency, variations of
exchange rates will change the debt burden and the level of consumption. Particularly, a
depreciation of the domestic currency will, to the extent that some of the maturing debt is
payable in domestic currency, ease the need for international liquidity and reduce the
possibility of a crisis. Obviously, holders of domestic currency denominated debt would
have to be compensated ex ante; however, such a currency risk premium may be worth
paying as the cost of insurance, since currency depreciation is typically associated with
economic contraction.
It should be clear that what matters for policy is the total amount of resources which
will need to be financed; such resource include maturing debt, but also other government
commitments. In particular, the accounting of relevant liabilities should include public
contingent liabilities, generated for example by implicit or explicit deposit insurance or
by social security disbursements. This is the case to the extent that such commitments
may become due and increase the amount that needs to be funded in the short run. A
sudden infusion of capital-  to the banking system, for instance, may require additional
"end of period" financial resources, which if not available on the domestic market, need
to be funded abroad. Incidentally, this consideration may be relevant to analyze the
consequences of the large supply of financial guarantees that is often considered a main
trigger of the East Asian crisis.
Finally, we may want to extend the notion of liability management to the full public
sector, as represented by the consolidation of the balance sheets of the government and of
the central bank, by considering the net foreign position of the public sector as a whole.
This extension will enable to bring into the discussion problems generated by the relation
15between foreign currency reserves held by the central bank and the stock of maturing
foreign currency debt that was a critical cause of the Mexican crisis in 1994.
Figure I helps visualize some consequences of liability mismanagement on the
exposure to financial contagion. The figure makes it clear that it is very risky to rely on
the fiscal discipline effect that may be generated by large amounts of foreign currency
denominated short term debt (Cole and Kehoe, 1996). In fact, a high level of short term
debt brings the economy toward the area of multiple equilibria, where the relevance of
fiscal discipline and more generally of macroeconomic policies is greatly reduced by the
unpredictable behavior of market expectations in the determination of the final
equilibrium. It should be also noted that identifying the relevant needs for liquidity, that
is, figuring out the size of B, is crucial in practice. Fiscal discipline may not be enough to
prevent financial instability if the amount of contingent liabilities explicitly or implicitly
associated to the safety net, and recorded as an "off balance" sheet item, iis  large or it is
perceived to be so by the market.
3.1.1.  The Selection of an Exchange Rate Regime
While our model did not include monetary and exchange rate elements, our approach
does have implications for monetary policy and exchange rate regimes. I'he most
convenient way of seeing these implications is to look at exchange rate regimes as
degrees of public commitment to a predefined external value of the currency. Each
regime then generates for the public sector "off balance" sheet liabilities which could be
due at the end of any period and may be cumulated to already maturing debt.
In a fixed exchange rate regime the liabilities of the consolidated public sector would
include also the central bank commitment to convert to foreign currency the short term
(monetary) liabilities of the banking sector (Chang and Velasco 1998, 1999). This
obligation would enormously increase the amount of potential short term foreign
borrowing required in a crisis. Any shocks to foreign currency reserves or to money
supply could shake market confidence in the stability of the exchange rate and would
generate selling pressures on the market, transformning  contingent liabilities into effective
liabilities.
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different. Although in principle currency boards should severe the link between runs on
banks and runs on currency, the Argentina experience of 1994 showed that both runs may
be correlated in a currency board regime.
Only in the case of a flexible exchange rate such "off balance sheet" liabilities can be
wiped out, substantially reducing the short-term liquidity needs of the government. More
specifically the net foreign position of the public sector would coincide with the
difference between the value of foreign currency reserves and foreign holdings of
domestic debt.
An altemative choice is to rely on the possibility of introducing capital controls. If
they are aimed at reducing foreign short-term capital inflows, they can be seen as
equivalent to an increase in the opportunity cost of investing short tern.  Capital controls
would generate both an upward shift of the OG curve in Chart 1 and a reduction of the
amount of short-term debt held by nonresidents.
Contagion is often generated by sovereign defaults but gets transmitted mostly
through currency crises. This fact suggests that, although the triggering element of
contagion may be related to a government default on its obligations (Mexico in 1994 and
Russia in 1998), the main factor of instability is related to foreign exchange commitments
which unduly extends the value of net public liabilities. Not always there has been a
coincidence of debt crisis and currency crisis. For instance, in the 1992 ERM crisis, the
run on weaker currencies was not paralleled by a run on the public debt of high indebted
countries, such as Italy, or by a run on individual banking systems. Contagion was limited
to the currency market and once the exchange rate commitment was lifted in England and
in Italy the crisis subsided. In our framework this can be explained as the result of the
sudden drop of short-term public liabilities generated by the exchange regime switch.
Graphically this can be seen as a sudden reversion of short-term liabilities from a crisis
level to a stability zone.
In contrast to the ERM crisis, the East Asian crisis was not limited to currency but
involved bank runs as well. Floating the exchange rates did not prove to be a sufficient
measure to revert these economies to the stability area. This may have been the
17consequence of large implicit liabilities associated to bank protection, which still left the
East Asian countries in the region of vulnerability.
Although no default on public debt took place, due to the low level of inherited debt,
spreads on sovereign issues remained high, a clear sign of market perception of increased
probability of dLefault.  The introduction of capital controls in Malaysia can be seen as an
extreme measure to avoid any further increase of short.term commitments towards
foreign investors.
3.2.  The Level of Bankruptcy Costs
Finally, the model posits a relationship between the cost of default and the exposure
to contagion. Also in this case it is useful to consider that cost not as a given paramneter
but as a variable that can be influenced by policy actions. In what follows we shall argue
the bankruptcy costs at a systemic level can be seen as a function of financial depth and
we shall therefore try to point at the structural reforms that may be required to foster the
financial depth of an economy and at their proper sequencing.
Although bankruptcy costs are generally taken as given, they are not exogenous and
generally depend from institutional features of different financial systems. The cost of
default of a sovereign borrower, or of the failure to honor the commitment of the
consolidated public sector, has a clear relationship with financial structure. The recent
wave of crises has provided abundant evidence that the depth and diversification of
financial systems (Greenspan, 1999), the degree of leverage of corporate sectors
(Claessens et al, 1998), and financial liberalization (Demirguc Kunt and Dletragiache,
1998) have an impact on the intensity of crises and on the resilience of the economic
system in the aftermath of a crisis. The cost of the crises has been measured both in terms
of the extent of deviations of GDP growth from trend (Demirguc Kunt and Detragiache,
1998) and of the cost of bank restructuring for public finances (Caprio and Klingebiel,
1998).
It is plausible that government insolvency will negatively reverberate on the financial
system as a whole and therefore have a larger impact on deeper financial systems. This is
not an overstatement if we consider that government in most developing countries is the
18implicit or explicit provider of insurance to the banking system, which in turn depends for
its stability on the stability of the corporate sector. More generally, when crises have a
systemic nature, government liabilities become, to a certain extent, an approximation of
the consolidated liabilities of major sectors of the economy.
In most developing economies the cost of financial disruption following a government
default on its debt can therefore be related to the level of financial depth. Supporting
evidence is provided by the lower intensity of the economic slump in Mexico when
compared with the recession in East Asian countries. The smaller amount of bank credit
to the private sector may indeed have been a relevant factor in helping a faster recovery in
Mexico than in East Asian. We do not have yet an assessment of the fiscal cost of bank
restructuring in East Asian countries but the comparison of the ratio of NPL to GDP
provide a first eloquent indicator of the relative severity of these crises.
Economies where financial claims account for a limited portion of the GDP will not
be able to fully exploit their growth potential but at the same time will not suffer too
much from a financial meltdown. In this case, which is broadly consistent with the
Russian experience, the incentives to default are high. In the graphical representation of
Figure I the Russian economy would be positioned in the lower part of the graph where
default can be triggered also at a low level of debt.
Why, then, did East Asian economies, where the claims of the banking sector are
multiple of GDP and face much higher bankruptcy costs, prove to be easy prey of
financial distress and did not resist contagion more effectively? The reason is largely
related to the lack of diversification of financial systems where the banking system is the
main supplier of funds to the economy. As a matter of fact, larger financial depth in
developing countries is often approximated by a large M2/GDP ratio (Levine et al.,
1998). As we have seen, a weak but large banking system may significantly add to the
contingent liabilities of the public sector and move the economy into the crisis area.
Again in our graphical representation we would posit an "only banking" deep and
weak financial system in the Northwest section of Chart 1. In that area, which is a crisis
zone or a default area, we have in fact both a high bankruptcy cost, generated by the
financial depth, and a high level of contingent liabilities, associated to the bank safety net.
A large but not diversified financial system is highly exposed to systemic crises, or as the
19Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Allan Greenspan, has put it "The lack of a spare
tire is of no concern if you do not get a flat. East Asia had no spare tires."' (Greenspan,
1999). An equally deep but more diversified financial economy, where equity and bond
markets may represent the necessary "spare tire", would instead be positioned in the
Northeast section, that is in a safer area. In this case, differently from the previous one,
we have a lower level of contingent liabilities for any given level of financial depth. It is
worth reiterating that, independently from the level of diversification of the financial
system, the shift toward a flexible exchange rate arrangement would pull the economy out
of more agitated waters if not inside the harbor.
Two implications can be drawn for policy purposes. First, a lower exposure to
contagion requires not only deeper but also more diversified systems. Second, the
centrality of banks in the financial system implies the need of a strong system of
regulation and supervision in order to relieve the burden of the safety net for the public
sector.
This discussion suggests a number of structural policy actions that mray usefully
complement liquidity management and exchange rate policies in driving the economy
outside the contagion area. A partial list would include the development of capital
markets, the effective protection of minority shareholders and of creditors' rights and a
cautious policy of financial liberalization.
Developing capital markets is essential for the emergence of long term debt
instruments. Capital markets do not, in fact, provide liquidity by maturilty  transformation -
as banks do - but by ensuring the liquidity of longer term claims and their prompt
negotiability on the markets. The development of markets for both longer term debt
instruments and stocks are therefore an essential step for better risk sharing.
Stock markets development, in turn, depends essentially on legal frameworks, on
minority shareholders protection from controlling shareholders. As for banks,
improvements depend to a relevant extent from the protection of creditors rights and from
the quality of regulation and supervision.
It is hard to argue against the need for diversification of the financial structure and
strengthening of the regulatory framework. More uncertain is the role of financial
liberalization. Financial liberalization provides the conditions for financial contagion; at
20the same time need not cause it and may be beneficial if contagion does not occur. But the
frequently claimed benefits of financial integration on the possibility of consumption
smoothing, on development of the investment opportunities and on the external
equilibrium have been recently cast in doubt by the destructive impact of capital
movements in the recent years. The problem is that financial liberalization has often
failed to provide a stable supply of capital for the amount of time required for
consumption to be smoothed along the economic cycle and for investment to become
productive.
Too often, financial liberalization -both internally and externally - has been a
synonym of accelerated development of short-termn  instruments. Domestic financial
liberalization, with its removal of limits to bank interest rates, credit expansion and
required reserves, has often resulted in a fast acceleration of bank credit and conversely of
money aggregates. External liberalization, in turn, has prompted a large upswing of short-
term inter-bank funding from more developed to developing economies.
Like financial deepening, financial liberalization is a double-sided phenomenon. It
may increase the strength and resilience of a financial system but also its exposure to
undesired runs. The costs of financial crisis intervening after the liberalization process
have been shown to offset the benefits deriving from improved financial integration
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). The experience of the recent wave of financial
liberalization processes seems to suggest that financial integration should be first sought
for longer maturity assets, which are less associated to the roll-over risk discussed in this
paper. In addition, the liberalization of financial decisions should be integrated by an
adequate monitoring of the short-term exposure of the main sectors of the economy with
respect to the foreign sector.
3.3.  The Need for Coordinated Policies
Clearly, what we need is a coordinated set of policies for reducing the exposure to
financial contagion. Without a proper coordination between the structural reforms
intended to increase the depth of financial markets and policies addressed to increase the
diversification of finding sources, the fragility of the system may increase instead of
21being reduced. Analogously, a financial liberalization that is not followed by a parallel
strengthening of the banking sector regulation and supervision may increase the exposure
to financial contagion of the economy. Finally, exchange rate policies need to be made
conditional on the strength of the banking system and public debt management needs to
take into account the exchange rate regime.
Three lessons have emerged so far. In the first place, the cost of ignoring policy
coordination is not a predefined bad outcome: it is an uncertain outcome. In other words
if, as a result of the lack of coordination, the economy is dragged into a crisis zone, it
becomes vulnerable to factors which are independent from the policy actions making the
outcome of thtose  policy, to a certain extent, unpredictable.
The second lesson is that there is no single policy is likely to achieve a better
insulation from contagion. More likely there are different combinations of liability
management, exchange rate policy and structural reform which are coherent with a shift
of the economy toward the stability zone. This appears to be an important conclusion
because it leaves flexibility in the process of policy implementation.
A third lesson is that in order to assess the exposure to contagion we may rely on the
analysis of three classes of policy actions. What makes this consideration relevant is that
it is independent from the source of financial contagion. To the extent that contagion is
generated  by foreign interest rate shocks and default expectation it is not relevant to know
the source of the shock or of the revision of expectation. In other words the proper policy
response is not dependent on the specific factor that might have generated a jump in the
level of foreign interest rates: be it due to the information processing teclnology,
portfolio allocation technology or by any other factor which affects international
investors' behavior. This seems to be particularly relevant if we consider that one of the
major implications of financial integration is exactly a larger exposure to international
interest rates shocks.
These lessons point to the relevance of a combined implementation of the three
classes of policy actions as preventive measures. A cursory review of recent episodes of
contagion may provide a useful guide to cases of failed or successful po:licy  coordination.
The "tequila crisis" hit Latin American countries as a consequence of the higher return
required by foreign investors to invest in the region in the afternath  of the crisis of
22Mexican Tesobonos. The interest rate shock was felt with particular strength in those
countries that were most strongly committed to a fixed parity with the dollar.
Argentina was severely hit by the crisis although it was not particularly vulnerable
from the point of view of its banking system or its outstanding public debt. Probably
thanks to these factors Argentina was able to withstand the crisis without abandoning the
currency board. Still the costs have been high in terms of growth. This has led to a further
reduction of the net foreign currency exposure of the country by introducing liquidity
requirement for banks and contingent liquidity arrangements with foreign private
financial institutions (Powell, 1999). At the same time, bank supervision has been
considerably strengthened also to reduce the level of public sector contingent liabilities.
It is interesting to observe that countries that adopted a more flexible approach to the
exchange rate and used capital controls, like Chile, were able to withstand the
consequences of the contagion with lower consequences in terms of output growth.
East Asian countries, differently from Latin American economies had much deeper
financial systems. In addition, the level of diversification of the financial system was low,
the banking system was structurally weak and a fixed exchange rate regime was in place.
These countries had a high level of public contingent liabilities related not only to the
exchange rate regime but also to the safety net. Floating their exchange rates proved
helpful to remove part of the pressure, but not sufficient to remove the causes of
instability.
Additional steps were needed in order to reduce the traditional weaknesses of the
banking system and to develop alternative channels of financial intermediation. Structural
reforms, though, require a long time to be put in place and cannot provide an immediate
protection from continuing exposure to financial contagion.
Very prudent policies with respect to net foreign financial liabilities need to be taken
in the transition toward a more strong financial system. From this perspective the
reintroduction of capital controls in Malaysia can be interpreted as a device to buy time. It
is interesting to observe that countries like Taiwan and Singapore, where bank liabilities
were more similar to more developed economies, suffered considerably lower pressure
also at the height of the crisis.
234.  Implications for International Policy
We have noted that the exposure of an economy to financial contagion is, in fact, to a
large extent dependent on past choices of economic policy. This means that the victims of
contagion are seldom absolutely powerless to prevent being infected. Sti:ll,  once in a crisis
zone, the outcome of domestic policy actions becomes uncertain and hostage to arbitrary
changes in market expectations; as a consequence, even appropriate policy may not be
able to avoid bad outcomes. In addition, the distribution of external shocks has changed
with the globalization of world capital market and extreme shocks have lbecome  more
frequent and of larger dimension. The consequence for developing countries is that the
risks of financial liberalization may have changed exactly at a time when they were
opening their capital accounts, lending support to the notion that the consequences of
financial integration might have been largely underestimated. From this perspective
emerging economies would seem to be the innocent victims of a process which is out of
their control (Calvo, 1998).
Such different views of limits and responsibilities of national policy makers are
reflected in the role which the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are expected to
play in preventing and managing episodes of financial contagion. If exposure to contagion
is due to inefficient macroeconomic management, the IFIs should ration their liquidity in
the occurrence of a crisis, in order to limit moral hazard. If, on the contrary, country
responsibility is limited, then generous liquidity support should be considered in order to
prevent negative externalities.
In this section we consider actions that should be taken at the international level to
cope with the spread of contagion. We shall focus on two comprehensive classes of
policies and discuss their relevance in light of our model:
*  The development of international financial standards or codes of conduct,
intended to improve the quality of financial supervision and to increase
transparency and accountability of domestic policy makers;
*  The provision of liquidity to crisis countries, through different policy instruments
and different strategies involving IFIs and the private sector.
24A key issue is the proper balance between the opposing goals of controlling moral
hazard and providing liquidity at an international level is very similar to that on the lender
of last of last resort at the national level. Should liquidity be provided freely and at no
penalty rates to crisis country in order to avoid bad equilibria, or should instead such a
policy be avoided in order to limit moral hazard and prevent countries to enter the crisis
zone? And what solutions are feasible if the amounts of liquid resources are inadequate to
make a credible commitment of liquidity support in the occurrence of a crisis?
We shall not try to provide an exhaustive survey of the remedies to the risk of
contagion that have been suggested in the debate on the reform of the international
financial architecture. In particular, we leave out of our discussion the effects of the
surveillance, undertaken by the IMF in its Article IV consultations, on the pursuit of
sound macroeconomic management. Such surveillance efforts are likely to result in a
more cautious macroeconomic management and are not different from those discussed in
the previous section.
4.1.  Improving Financial Standards
Recent crises have underscored that national financial infrastructures need to be
urgently upgraded in order to reduce the costs of financial integration. Different rules,
different codes of conduct may lead, in the event of financial liberalization, to major
shortcomings. It has been said recently that "if the planned route for a superhighway
draws near to a primitive village, it is not a good idea to design an off-ramp that dumps
high-speed traffic into the center of the town before its streets are paved, intersections are
regulated and pedestrian have learnt the dangers of walking in the street" (Frenkel, 1999).
The adoption of common standards is likely to reduce the costs faced in the process
of financial liberalization, as well as to increase transparency and to reduce moral hazard.
The development and dissemination of internationally recognizable standards would help
countries to identify their institutional weakness and, if compliance with the standards
can be monitored and made transparent, would strengthen their incentives to take
corrective action early. At the same time, better investment decisions can be made by
25allowing market participants to assess information on potential borrowers in light of
international benchmarks.
It is arguable that in several occasions the severity of the crisis has not been foreseen
due the lack of adequate statistical information on the financial structure of relevant
sectors of the economy. This, in our theoretical framework, amounts to the lack of a
precise understanding of the dimension of short-term public commitments and, therefore,
of the country's exposure to financial contagion. Without appropriate measurement, the
authorities of an emerging economy may believe that they are in the no crisis region,
while the truth is that they are in the crisis zone or even in the default zone. Interestingly,
such a conjecture has been confirmned  by a recent recommendation of the Financial
Stability Forum. That Forum suggests that an urgent step towards a better management of
the international financial system is the extensive collection of statistical information on
the net foreign financial positions of the major sectors of several economies.
The growing perception of the relevance of common international standards has led to
the development of new codes of conducts. New guidelines recently issued by
international bodies include the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision set out
by the Basel Committee in 1997; the IMF's Special Data Dissemination Standard; the
IASC's International Accounting Standards; and IOSCO's Objectives and Principles of
Securities Regulation, which provides a pragmatic base for national regulators to
establish codes for security markets that can be tailored to their own countries.
Meanwhile, new standards are being developed by international institutions in their core
areas of expertise, like the IMF's guidelines for monetary, fiscal and financial policy
transparency. Less satisfactory is the progress in bankruptcy standards and corporate
governance standards, where greater opposition needs to be faced to change considerably
different traditions and legal systems.
The approval of new regulatory standards, and even their introduction in the domestic
regulations, is only the first step of a more complex process. While the establishment of
international standards is an important step towards crisis prevention, it is even more
important to encourage the actual implementation and monitor the adherence to
standards. Enforcement will typically be difficult unless some stringent and observable
pararneters are devised and subject to international surveillance. A relevant example is
26provided by minimum bank capital requirements, along the lines set out by the Basel
Committee in 1988. Such requirements were introduced by most developing countries but
only nominally enforced, as can be gathered from the generalized compliance with the
eight per cent ratio by all the East Asian banking systems before the crisis. The awareness
of these problems has generated a intense debate on how to provide an effective
surveillance. A concerted effort in this direction is the joint IMF - World Bank's
Financial System Stability Assessments program, aimed at evaluating the health and
vulnerabilities of members' countries financial systems. The program also includes the
assessment of compliance with the BCBS Core Principles.
The transparency resulting from compliance with best practice rules would not, by
itself, solve the problems generated by an inadequate incentive structure. The common
perception that, with increased transparency, the private sector should be able to play a
greater role may be incorrect. As Stiglitz and Bhattacharya (1999) discuss extensively, in
the presence of externalities market mechanisms alone, even with improved transparency,
would not be sufficient to ensure prompt and systematic adherence of standards.
Transparency needs to be integrated to the different nature of incentives required by
developing countries, which are mostly recipient of international financial flows, by
developed countries which are often home of the major financial intermediaries, and by
individual creditors. Among the incentives that need to be modified in developed
countries is the more favorable treatment of G-  10 countries' banks for short termn  lending
to developing countries. The maturity of capital outflows needs to be monitored by
looking at the maturity composition of their creditors liabilities.
New rules on debt rescheduling in the event of a crisis have been proposed to be
included in bond contracts by the G-1O  after the Mexican crises (Fisher, 1999). The G-22
report on International Financial Crises has also suggested that a qualified majority rule
be included to facilitate the restructuring of bonds contract in the event of a crisis. More
generally, provisions to enhance creditor protection in the intemational arena, along lines
similar to those followed at the national level, have been suggested by Miller and Stiglitz
(1999).
Overall, improvements of standards in developing countries and the revision of the
structure of incentives in more developed economies are part of a common effort to
27enable market discipline to play a more effective role in preventing larger iEnancial
imbalances and to help the construction of a more stable system.
4.2.  The Suipply  of International Liquidity
To the extent that the previous standard setting policies accomplish their goal, we can
expect the weaknesses of any single economy and the responsibility of international and
domestic policy makers to become clear faster and in a much more uncontroversial way
than it has been the case. Increased transparency should also help reduce nmoral  hazard,
with a beneficial effect on the amount of contingent public liabilities. All these policies,
though, cannot prevent the realizations of a bad equilibrium to obtain should a crisis
occur.
A policy of liquidity provision to crisis countries can eliminate the uncertainty and
lack of coordination that result in the occurrence of bad outcomes. But there are several
questions associated with such a policy. For example, its financing is a key issue, and
may require a commitment from the international community. The lack of an
international central bank able to issue high-powered money requires that enough funds
be set aside for their use in the occasion of a crisis. While a national central bank can
print money when required, for an international lender of last resort the provision of
liquidity requires, as in the case of a currency board, the establishment of an adequate
amount of liquid reserves. Only based on these reserves can a promise to provide liquidity
gain credibility.
Major steps have been done in the recent years to increase the amount;  of resources
available to sustain countries that have experienced or may be experiencing negative
outcomes. Notwithstanding these efforts, which have led to a series of quota increases,
the IMF has today a size with respect to the GDP of its member countries of only one
third of that at its inception in 1945 (Fisher 1999). These reserves can be increased, in
case of systemaic  problems, by borrowing from the New or the General Arrangement to
Borrow.
In spite of their limited resources, the IFIs have introduced new facilities intended to
increase the amount of resources to be deployed with short notice; notably, these facilities
28have features devised to limit moral hazard. This is the case of the Emergency Financing
Mechanism introduced after the Mexican crisis, of the IMF's Supplemental Reserve
Facility (SRF) established in 1997, of the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) introduced in
April 1999, and of the supply of guarantee on the part of the World Bank.
In addition to a large and more liquid supply of finds from the IFIs, it has been
recognized that the resources to be deployed in a crisis should in the future rely on the
contribution of the private sector to a larger extent. A source of private funds may be
untapped by often debated changes in bond contracts, allowing qualified majorities to
modify the bond covenants in order to facilitate bond roll-over in the event of a crisis.
This is much in the same spirit that led in the past to rolling over syndicated bank loans.
An additional source of funds has been pioneered by Argentina, South Africa, and
Mexico, who have entered a financial contract with consortiums of foreign commercial
banks for the provision of liquidity in times of crisis.
Once the amount of resources available for liquidity provision has been settled, there
is the need to establish guidelines for the execution of assistance policies. What are the
features of an International Lender of Last Resort and how effectively can it address the
issue of preventing and managing the occurrence of episodes of financial contagion? We
shall consider this question, first, from the perspective of liquidity creation, and then
looking at the potential implications for moral hazard.
Our theoretical discussion implies that, to the extent that liquid resources are
sufficient to fully meet a debtor position, a crisis can be effectively eliminated. This
implication can be illustrated with reference to the model of Section 2. Assume that an
intemational institution is committed to step in if the new debt auction is unsuccessful,
purchasing all the unsold bonds at the prevailing world retum. Referring to the graphical
representation of equilibria in Chart 1, we observe that in this case the bad outcome
possibility effectively disappears -and with it the OG curve in Chart 1. Default will
obtain with probability zero on the left hand side of the schedule OH and with probability
I on the right hand side. Both the crisis zone and the eventuality of contagion are
effectively dispelled by the promise of a full financing in the event of a crisis.
Notably, it turns out to be crucial from the IFI's perspective to be able to properly
assess the weakness of the economy before lending takes place. In the simplified setting
29of our model this requires to verify if the economy's level of debt is on the right or on the
left hand side of B2 in Chart 1. In the first case, the failure of the initial period auction
cannot be addressed by a lending policy because the borrower would default in any case
and the IFI would ultimately lose its fund. To the left of B2 the funding would instead
ensure a good equilibrium, and the IFI would be repaid at the expiration of the loan.
Let us now consider a more realistic case in which the amount of funds is lent at a
penalty rate; this can be justified by Bagehot principles, in order to limit moral hazard.
Suppose that, once the IFI is satisfied that the economy is illiquid but not willing to
default, it will participate in the auction of public bonds and underwrite at aL  penalty rate
the bonds left by the foreign investors. In this case, the crisis zone does not completely
disappear, as in the no penalty case. Instead, it will shrink; this can be represented by a
new schedule OH* (the same as OH, except that r is replaced by the penalty rate) which
defines the conditions under which default of the debt rolled over debt would obtain. In
Figure 3, the crisis zone is given by the interval between B4 and B2.1 0 The presence of a
smaller crisis zone is generated by the higher fiscal costs associated with the penalty rate
lending. But this does not prevent a good outcome to prevail if the debt level is not too
close to the default area.
Let us finally consider one case in which the IFI's lending is conditional on some
macroeconomic policy to be undertaken by the borrower in order to improve its future
solvency. Conditionality has often been thought as a cost for the borrower intended to
discourage moral hazard and provide a guarantee of repayment; it has therefore been used
as a substitute to collateral, which has not been frequently posted. In the sirnplified setting
of our model we cannot properly consider the effect of conditionality on moral hazard,
but we can point to the effects which it may have on the stability of short run equilibria.
Differently from the posting of collateral, conditionality may reduce the country's
available income - if a policy of fiscal restraint is called for. In this case the effects on
income and consumption of a new lending from the IFIs is the same of rise of foreign
interest rates, described in the previous section, and can be seen as upward shift of the
lower bound of the crisis zone represented by the schedule OH. From this perspective the
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CCL facility seems to have a number of desirable properties. In fact CCL are supposed to
be granted to countries who have satisfactory macroeconomic performance, are reducing
their structural weaknesses and whose exposure to crisis is well known. For these
economies the imposition of a penalty rate should not have the undesired effect of
shifting the economy from the stability area toward the crisis zone.
Our theory can also help evaluate the role that could be played by creditor protection
schemes in a situation of distress. In this case, whether through the introduction of a
payment stay, a restructuring of existing debt, or simply a rollover of expiring bonds, we
would have the present level of debt being refinanced by the previous bondholders. As a
consequence, the good equilibrium would be ensured, if there is one. Notably, this
solution may have been enforced in Malaysia, where the introduction of control on capital
outflows effectively amounted to a forced rollover of the existing debt of foreign
investors for one year.
Can we conclude that devices intended to reduce moral hazard have the undesired
effects of reducing the stabilizing effect associated with liquidity provision in a
situation of distress? This appears to be an effect to be considered when addressing the
31problems generated by the presence of multiple equilibria in a short time interval. In a
longer time perspective, though, the net effects of risk sharing devices intenrded  to
reduce oral hazard need to be taken into account. Although our one period model is not
well suited to describe the effects that the liquidity provision has on the actions
undertaken by economic agents some qualitative considerations can be drawn. In the
first place a policy of lending at penalty rate or conditional on fiscal adjustments which
is stated in advance and followed in a crisis will generate a stabilizing effect on the
selection of the level of debt exposure with foreign investors. In fact, rational agents
will avoid generating a level of debt that may place the economy in a fragile position.
From this perspective, the reintroduction of a crisis zone, which we have observed in
the case of a penalty rate and of a conditional lending, may induce private agents and
the government to avoid exposures larger than those compatible with the stabilizing
effects of the lender of last resort. In our graphic representation the effect will be of
reducing the level of debt "inherited" from the past with respect to the level which
would have prevailed otherwise. The menace of a crisis window would then induce
stabilizing behavior.
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